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Abstract 
By order of the Secretary of Defense, all of the US Air Force's F-16 units were 
tasked to improve their fleet health to a Mission Capability (MC) rate of 80 percent, as 
part of a Department of Defense-wide push to make its Critical Aviation Platforms, and 
the units that employ them, more ready and lethal. This study uses historical fleet health 
and sortie execution data captured from LIMS-EV (Weapon System Viewer, 2020) to 
create a multiple regression model that quantifies the value of increased fleet health, 
defined as either MC rate or Aircraft Availability (AA) rate, in terms of increasing sortie 
output. It also uses forecasted near-future sortie demand to assess the utility of the 80 
percent MC rate standard towards achieving desired sortie execution levels. This research 
concludes that both AA rate and MC rate correlate with increased aircraft utilization and 
that an increase in either fleet health metric correlates to increased annual utilization of 
roughly five sorties per aircraft. It also identifies AA rate as a more significant input to 
sortie execution than MC rate.  Furthermore, it suggests that an AA rate standard of 71 
percent is most appropriate for achieving the aircraft utilization levels needed to satisfy 
pilot training requirements.  
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MC80: QUANTIFYING THE EFFECT OF FLEET HEALTH ON SORTIE 
EXECUTION IN THE F-16 FLEET 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
In September of 2018, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis directed the 
United States Air Force and United States Navy to increase the health of four fighter 
aircraft fleets – namely, the F-16, F-22, F-35, and F-18, which are cited as “Critical 
Aviation Platforms” – to a Mission Capability (MC) rate of 80 percent by the end of 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2019. This order came as a wake-up call to the flying and maintenance 
communities, who had all experienced declining fleet health in recent years. F-16 Wings’ 
problems mirrored that of most other wings operating legacy aircraft fleets: shrinking 
aircraft inventories, declining Aircraft Availability (AA) of the remaining fleet, and lower 
sortie utilization of the aircraft. For historical perspective, the last time that the active 
duty F-16 fleet averaged 80 percent MC over the course of a fiscal year was in FY10. It 
had a 24-month moving average of 72.5 percent MC at the time of the announcement. A 
visual depiction of the F-16 fleet’s declining performance over time is provided below. In 
the wake of Secretary Mattis’s order, operations and maintenance leaders across the Air 
Force at all levels began working initiatives, all of which collectively became known as 
MC80, in an effort to boost fleet health (Mehta, 2019). 
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Figure 1. Declining F-16 Fleet Performance over Time (LIMS-EV, 2019) 
 
Upon the end of FY19, the deadline for Secretary Mattis’s directive, many 
indicators showed how the MC80 endeavor was successful within the active duty Air 
Force’s F-16 fleet. Largely as a result of the MC80 efforts, the FY19 annual MC rate 
average rose to 75.6 percent, the highest achieved since FY14. This success is even more 
evident when scoped down to just the active duty 291 combat coded F-16s, where FY19 
yielded a 76.3 percent annual MC rate and included two months with an MC rate above 
80 percent (June and July 2019), a feat that had not been achieved since April of 2013. 
Despite these limited successes, the conclusion of FY19 was far from “mission 
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accomplished” for MC80, as the expectation for FY20 and beyond is to continue working 
towards and beyond a sustained 80 percent MC rate (Mattis, 2018). 
Problem Statement 
Overall, a key problem with MC80 is that it appears to the unit-level maintainers 
tasked with achieving it to be an arbitrary goal: nobody would dispute that fighter 
availability can and should be improved, but why 80 percent MC rate, specifically? The 
MC80 order came out without a significant amount of explanation as to why that level of 
fleet health is more acceptable than the levels achieved in FY18, or of any level of fleet 
health in between. When a goal such as MC80 is set, those who are tasked with executing 
it would benefit from understanding the associate benefits. While it is reasonable to 
assume that a healthier fleet can execute more sorties than a less healthy one, this 
relationship is not adequately researched. 
Purpose Statement and Research Questions 
The objective of this research is to evaluate the effect of fleet health, an assumed 
binding constraint to USAF flying operations, on sortie execution rates. The questions 
that this research seeks to answer are as follows: 
1) Can MC and/or AA rates be quantifiably correlated to increased aircraft 
utilization (SUTE)? 
2) Is an 80 percent MC rate a valuable goal to achieve the necessary levels of 
flying? If not, what would a more functional goal be? 
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Assumptions and Limitations 
This research is limited specifically to the Active duty F-16 fleet that carries an 
Aircraft Purpose Code (APC) of CC – Combat. The reasons for scoping perspective 
down from all of the named Critical Aviation Platforms to just this specific subset are 
explained in chapter III within this thesis. Furthermore, the analysis performed relies on 
some assumptions made about F-16 pilot manning levels, the experience mix of the pilot 
inventory, and the size of the F-16 fleet, in order to calculate a forecasted sortie demand. 
These assumptions are also explained in greater depth in chapter III. 
Implications 
This research aims to provide insight for the operations and maintenance 
communities concerning the relationship between fleet health and mission execution. 
This research will either validate the utility of the current fleet health goal or will provide 
an alternative that is based on achieving desired sortie production outcomes.  
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
An extensive amount of base knowledge is required to understand the 
relationships between fleet health and fleet utilization. Fortunately, there is a wealth of 
academic literature examining Air Force operations and resource utilization. A review of 
the literature was conducted prior to and throughout the research process, covering the 
topics of fleet health, sortie demand and pilot training requirements, and linear regression 
applications to military problem sets. 
Fleet Health and Maintenance Performance Metrics 
It is of utmost importance to understand when conducting research about the 
outcomes of fleet health that the metrics by which fleet health is measured are clearly 
understood. MC rates are used throughout the Air Force as a key indicator of 
maintenance performance and are generally synonymous with fleet readiness (Oliver, 
2001). MC rate is defined as the total amount of time that an aircraft or fleet accrues in 
fully mission capable or partially mission capable status as a percentage of the total time 
that the aircraft or fleet is possessed at a unit. MC rate is also a subset of a more 
encompassing metric, Aircraft Availability, which instead provides a percentage of total 
MC time for an aircraft or fleet as a percentage of the total time the aircraft is possessed 
by the Air Force at large, to include depot possession and unit possessed – not reported 
status. (Chapa, 2013). When calculating both, the numerator in each equation is the same, 
as AA hours or MC hours are the same thing; however, the difference is how to define 
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the denominator, as either possessed hours (MC rate) or Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI) 
hours (AA rate). AA rate is believed to give a more holistic perspective of fleet health, 
whereas MC rate focuses on the performance of the unit-level maintenance effort. Figure 
2 illustrates how the different accounting of variables yields a difference between MC 
and AA rates.  
 
Figure 2.  Calculation Differences in MC Rate vs. AA Rate (HAF/A4PR, 2019) 
  
 The other heavily-discussed metric used throughout this research is aircraft 
utilization, which will be defined as the total sorties per aircraft per year. Annual sortie 
utilization (SUTE), is a measure of how well a unit is able to employ its assigned fleet. 
Dividing the total sortie output by the number of aircraft the unit has at its disposal 
corrects for fleet size and makes a more apt barometer of resource management between 
units. In the Maintenance Metrics Handbook published by the Air Force Logistics 
Management Agency, low fleet health (in terms of low MC rate and/or AA rate) and 
ineffective scheduling are pointed to as the driving factors behind low SUTE (Rainey et 
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al., 2001). This answer to the first research question will either support or disprove the 
causality of low fleet health to low SUTE. 
 Air Force Instruction 21-103 contains direction on how Combat Air Forces units 
and fleets are expected to calculate their AA standard. The first step is to determine 
“operational requirements” in accordance with the formula in Figure 3 below, which 
quantifies the requirement as a number of MC aircraft needed, on average, in a given day.  
 
Figure 3. Operational Requirement Formula (AFI 21-103, 2017) 
 
This number of needed MC aircraft is divided by the TAI of the applicable unit(s) 
to determine the AA standard. This remains the current process for units and MAJCOMs 
to determine AA goals, and prior to MC80, this AA standard was also used as the 
baseline for determining MC rate standards.  
Ritschel et al. (2018) found that there is a high correlation between AA hours and 
sorties flown. This is a logical conclusion, as it would make sense that an aircraft or a 
fleet that can be flown more will be flown more if the demand for sorties exists. The 
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authors determined that the general trend across all aircraft in the US Air Force is for 
every hour of increased availability an aircraft attains, five percent of that hour becomes a 
flying hour; this is a significant finding as it shows a relatively low return on the effort 
needed to increase AA. Ritschel et al. (2018) offered several potential explanations for 
this finding, primarily that most of AA hours occur at times that the aircraft cannot be 
utilized and is sitting idle awaiting the next flying opportunity. Another finding from this 
thesis was a 96.8 percent correlation between sorties executed and available hours in the 
whole Air Force F-16 fleet. Their study did not account for proportionality of AA hours 
or sorties executed to fleet size, however, such as correlating AA rate and SUTE, which 
is an objective that this research will attempt to achieve. The reason this distinction is 
important is to because when controlling for changes in fleet size, finding correlation 
between fleet health and utilization would indicate a cause-effect relationship, as opposed 
to coinciding decreases in both AA hours and total executed sorties that happen 
inevitably as fleet size decreases. 
Sortie Demand and Pilot Training 
Broadly speaking, the two requirements that drive sortie demand outside of real-
world operations are upgrades and continuation training. The expectations for pilot 
training and progression are contained in two key documents; the most foundational of 
which is Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 11-2F-16V1. According to this manual, when a 
pilot trainee completes MDS-unique flying training and arrives at their operational unit, 
they must complete Mission Qualification Training (MQT) specific to their unit’s 
mission set. Once mission qualified, the pilot continues up a chain of upgrades: from 
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wingman to flight lead, from flight lead to instructor, and for some from instructor to 
evaluator. Each of these upgrades add value to a pilot’s utility in the squadron, as 
wingmen cannot fly without at least one other person of at least flight lead qualification 
in formation with them, and that instructor pilot(s) must fly in the formation to complete 
MQT or Flight Lead Upgrade sortie, and so on (FLUG) (Dahlman and Thaler, 2000).  
Prior to beginning instructor pilot upgrade (IPUG), a flight lead-qualified pilot must first 
gain the designation of experienced pilot by accumulating a specific number of sorties in 
the F-16 as outlined in AFMAN 11-2F-16V1, which for most pilots is set at 250 but can 
be pro-rated for pilots who come from first-assignment instructor pilot duty or who cross 
over from another fighter airframe. 
When not actively involved in an upgrade to earn flight lead or 
instructor/evaluator pilot status, pilots are continuously working towards attaining and 
maintaining monthly, quarterly, and annual flying requirements as directed by the second 
crucial flying requirements document; the Ready Aircrew Program (RAP) Tasking 
Memorandum (RTM). The number of sorties that each pilot must execute in a given 
month is dependent upon two criteria: first, whether they are designated as inexperienced 
or inexperienced, where the inexperienced pilots require more sorties than experienced; 
and second, if they are expected to maintain Combat Mission Ready (CMR) status or 
Basic MC status (BMC), where the CMR pilots require more sorties than BMC. Table 1 
below illustrates monthly, quarterly, and annual sortie count requirements according to 
the RTM. 
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Table 1. F-16 RAP Sortie Requirements (ACC/A3T, 2018) 
 
 
Beyond simple sortie count, however, the RTM also specifies, on an annual basis, 
what specific mission profiles must be flown for sorties to qualify towards RAP. The 
table below is a depiction of the various mission types and amounts thereof that must be 
executed annually to stay proficient by RAP standards.  
Table 2. F-16 RAP Mission Type Requirements (ACC/A3T, 2018) 
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The figure below is a visual representation of the continuation training concept, 
showing how CMR is assessed at the individual level, and how pilots can regain currency 
if they fail to meet RAP flying requirements. This figure is from a briefing that occurred 
at the US Air Force’s sortie production training summit in June 2018.  
 
Figure 4. RAP Lookback Flowchart (Ross, 2018) 
 
Conclusively, the various kinds of training and upgrading criteria that occur 
simultaneously add sensitivity and complexity to calculating and maintaining sortie 
demand levels. While any and all F-16 sorties count towards achieving the experience 
milestone, sorties only count towards achieving RAP if they can count towards one of the 
required mission type quotas. Upgrade sorties are even more complex and difficult to 
achieve, as they involve very specific scenarios that put a heavy demand on scheduling 
other pilots to fill support flying roles. Figure 5 shows the true extent of this “it takes a 
12 
 
village…” concept, showing just how many sorties are required, in total, to achieve the 
relatively small number of scenarios for a single pilot in upgrade training. 
 
Figure 5. FLUG Sortie Demand by Mission (Walsh et al., 2019) 
 
 The above figure shows how F-16 FLUG requires 62 sorties to accomplish 12 
missions for the upgrade pilot. These numbers are comparable for MQT (52 sorties to 
accomplish 11 missions) and IPUG (62 sorties to accomplish 12 missions). Ideally, pilots 
are scheduled in these mission support sorties in a way that also satisfies one of their 
required RAP mission types, but a 2019 RAND research revealed that this does not 
always occur (Walsh et al., 2019). 
A case study of the 388th Fighter Wing at Hill AFB, then an active duty F-16 
wing, was conducted in 2000 by RAND researchers Dahlman and Thaler. In their report, 
the researchers found that balancing experience level and upgrade qualifications are 
extremely important to maintaining a consistent sortie demand. The report went on to 
describe the cycle of negative effects that occur when experience level skews lower than 
standard.  First, maintenance units are overtasked to provide additional sorties demanded 
to keep an outsize proportion of inexperienced pilots flying at CMR rates. Additionally, 
flight leads and instructor pilots have to fly beyond their RAP requirements and focus on 
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training the surplus of inexperienced wingmen, consuming an outsize portion of available 
sorties. Collectively, this causes a shortage of available sorties remaining for other pilots’ 
continuation training, causing these pilots to miss RAP and regress. Individuals 
regressing and requiring additional sorties further continues the pattern of demand 
exceeding output, creating a “death-spiral” feedback loop. Dahlman and Thaler (2000) 
concluded that the proportion of CMR-experienced pilots in an F-16 flying squadron 
must stay at or above 52 percent experience level to avoid such a situation.. 
 Nineteen years later, three more RAND Corporation researchers reassessed the 
relationship between sortie requirements, SUTE rate, manning/experience levels, and 
operational tempo by using a simulation of the 20th Fighter Wing’s operations at Shaw 
Air Force Base in South Carolina. Several pieces of information were gleaned from the 
findings of Walsh et al. (2019). The authors determined, along with other findings, that 
units are dependent upon the increased operations tempo of TDYs and deployments to 
achieve required sortie volume to maintain RAP standards.  In addition, the authors 
reported that units must execute 5 to 10 percent more sorties than is dictated by squadron 
composition to account for non-RAP effective sorties. These ineffective sorties come 
from a variety of root causes, such as air aborts due to aircraft malfunction or weather, 
airshow flights, and sorties where training was unsatisfactory and requires reattempt. 
However, Walsh et al. (2019) primarily attributed the sortie waste to a mismatch of RAP 
mission type requirements that the pilots need for their own training versus the sortie 
profiles they get scheduled for in TDY and upgrade mission support scenarios. Most 
significantly, the study determined that an attempt to boost crew ratio in the squadron 
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through a surge in new FTU graduates would require increases in utilization to levels 
beyond the apparent ability of the maintenance enterprise in order to maintain training 
and upgrade timelines, and could cause a “death spiral” scenario as laid out by Dahlman 
and Thayer’s research from two decades earlier. Furthermore, several assumptions about 
flying unit makeup and operations tempo are carried forward from RAND’s simulations 
into this research, which will be discussed in chapter III within this thesis. 
Linear Regression Applications to Military 
Several theses produced by Air Force Institute of Technology have worked 
towards building regression models to explain and/or predict AA and MC rates in various 
platforms by using other metrics and measures of data (Oliver, 2001; Fry, 2010; Chapa, 
2013). This thesis builds upon the research of these three by using similar modeling 
techniques but with a different aim: using AA as an independent input variable, along 
with other data, to predict sortie execution outputs. Also contained within these theses are 
a litany of other metrics and measures to consider and test as potential input variables to 
explain sortie execution variance in the model built in chapter IV. 
Summary 
In this chapter, the baseline understanding of Air Force flying requirements, as 
well as research regarding the concepts and methodologies applicable to this research 
effort, were discussed. This research attempts to fill a gap in the literature by testing the 
relationship between AA and sortie execution in a way that controls for changes to fleet 
size: this link, if established, will answer the first research question. Also, this chapter 
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provided the context for calculating and forecasting future sortie demands, which will be 
important in the employment of the regression model built to satisfy the second research 
question.   
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter will cover the scope of the research, data collection, and the steps 
taken to create and employ a regression model. 
Scope 
As mentioned in the introduction, this research will focus on the combat-coded F-
16 fleet in the active duty US Air Force. This specific subset of the DoD’s aircraft 
inventory was chosen for several reasons. First, the field of options is narrowed down to 
F-16s and F-22s due to the simplicity of studying platforms that are exclusively US Air 
Force owned and operated within DoD.  Next, the F-16 fleet is identified as preferable to 
F-22s for this study due to a greater amount of organic support (and thus simpler 
understanding of maintenance capability) and longevity of data in steady-state operations. 
Once narrowed down to the F-16 fleet, the scope was further refined to active 
duty and combat coded APC aircraft. Focusing on this specific community is useful 
because all units within it have relative uniformity of sortie demand and of sortie 
production capacity. The uniformity of sortie demand comes from consistent manning, 
mission, training requirements, and scheduling of the flying squadrons across combat 
fighter wing. Lastly, the uniformity of sortie production capacity is defined in terms of 
the combat wings’ maintenance units maintaining consistent manning, funding, and 
scheduling. 
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Data Gathering 
In order to build the regression model, twenty years of historical data (FY00-
FY19) regarding fleet health, size, and flying execution was gathered through the Air 
Force’s LIMS-EV database. Data was collected from an annual (20 data points) and  
monthly perspective (240 data points). Then, to employ the model, current-day data 
regarding pilot inventory, experience mix, and RAP sortie requirements were gathered 
through the assignment management system database and through documents in the 
literature review, respectively. The below figure gives more granular detail on the data 
collected. 
 
Figure 6. Data Collection Sourcing and Purpose 
 
Model Creation 
 In this phase of the research, a total of 6 models were built. The first step was to 
create three initial models by using simple bivariate analysis. The first of these three 
models cover the relationship already explored in the research accomplished by Ritschel 
et al. (2018), fitting raw annual sorties by raw annual AA hours. This serves as the 
baseline model that the other two relationships will be compared to. The next two 
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bivariate analyses were fitted using annual SUTE by annual AA rate and annual SUTE by 
annual MC rate, respectively. Once all three initial models are built, additional 
potentially-significant variables were added to see if they help explain more of the 
variation in the dependent variable while retaining a sufficiently low p-value indicating 
statistical significance. The outcome of this process is a linear equation creating a “line of 
best fit” that quantifies the relationship between the independent variable(s) and 
dependent variable. Equation 1 below demonstrates the standard form of a multiple 
regression model. 
 Y ൌ β0 ൅ β1X1 ൅ β2X2 ൅ …. ൅ βnXn ൅ 𝓔     ሺ1ሻ 
Where: 
 Y = dependent variable (ex: SUTE rate) 
 X1, X2,…Xn = independent variables (ex: TAI, AA, crew ratio, etc.) 
 β 1, β 2,… β n ൌ coefficient of contribution of given independent variable 
β0 ൌ intercept 
𝓔 ൌ error, unaccounted for by model 
 
Once this process is completed, the two novel models (AA rate to SUTE and MC 
rate to SUTE) were compared against each other and the baseline model (AA hours to 
sorties) to evaluate these various relationships. This was also accomplished with the 
monthly data, for a total of 6 models. The only notable difference in creating these 
models is that monthly seasonality was accounted for with indicator variables, with 
October (the first month of each FY) as the baseline. When all six models were finalized, 
a single best fit model was selected for residual analysis and for use in determining the 
significance of either AA or MC rate in aircraft utilization. 
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Residual Analysis 
In order to check the model’s validity, an analysis of the residuals must be 
accomplished. In this research, a residual analysis checked for the following 
characteristics: normality, independence, and constant variance. The normal distribution 
of residuals was assessed by checking the shape of a histogram of residuals for a “bell-
curve” shape. Independence was assessed by utilizing a Durbin-Watson test and scoring a 
sufficiently high p-value. Finally, constant variance was assessed by plotting residuals 
over predicted value and looking for patterns that suggest the magnitude of residual is 
influenced by the magnitude of prediction, which would invalidate the model (Bowerman 
et al., 2005). If the model passes all three of these tests, it will be utilized in the final step 
of the analysis to answer the second research question. 
Model Employment 
 In this final phase of analysis, the variables of the newly-built and validated 
multiple regression equation were populated with the calculated required SUTE and 
assumed values for the other independent variable to solve algebraically for the required 
AA or MC rate. The first step in the phase of analysis was to calculate the required SUTE 
by separating the pilot inventory into subsets based on experience mix and then 
multiplying each subset by its annual RAP requirement. These sortie requirement 
numbers were then aggregated, and an additional 10 percent in overage was added in 
accordance with the findings of Walsh et al. (2019). This final raw sortie demand was 
then divided by TAI to determine the SUTE requirement. This process of calculating 
SUTE requirement without a complete set of perfect data requires several assumptions. 
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The first assumption, as directed by the research sponsor, is that the pilot inventory is 100 
percent of pilot authorizations at the combat wings in the Assignment Management 
System database. The second assumption, also directed by the research sponsor, is that 
TAI remains constant from the end of FY19. The final assumption is that the experience 
mix that Walsh et al. (2019) found at the 20th Fighter Wing and used in their simulation 
study can be employed within this thesis as the whole pilot inventory across the combat-
coded community. 
Once the SUTE requirement is calculated and all other independent variables (not 
including whichever fleet health metric) are populated, the equation can be solved for the 
fleet health metric target. 
Summary 
This chapter laid out the roadmap for successful model building, validation, and 
employment. It also laid out the necessary data collection and working assumptions for 
model development. 
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
Data Gathering and Description 
Historical sortie execution and fleet health data were gathered, as described in the 
previous chapter. The below table describes the data collected for model creation.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (LIMS-EV, 2019) 
 
  
 Also collected in this portion of the analysis were the pilot inventory of 440 pilots 
(Search Authorizations, 2020), projected aircraft inventory of 290 TAI (LIMS-EV, 2019), 
experience mix of 35 percent CMR-I, 47.5 percent CMR-E, 17.5 percent BMC-E (Walsh 
et al., 2019), and cost of business sortie requirement of 10 percent of calculated RAP 
requirement (Walsh et al., 2019). 
Non-Modeling Data Review 
A cursory exploration of the collected data revealed some trends that are worth 
understanding when moving forward with analysis. A consistent decline in TAI and a 
general downward trend in AA rate explain the consistent downward trend in total AA 
hours. Also, the consistent decrease in total sorties flown is a function of the decreasing 
TAI and of the general trend of decreasing SUTE. Another finding was that FY12 and 
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FY13 seemed to contain abnormally low sortie utilization, despite relatively healthy 
fleets. This is attributable to budget constraints in those years: according to conversations 
with contacts in ACC/A3T, the office that controls the flying hour program, FY12 was 
affected by an efficiency experiment where the flying units were intentionally allocated 
10 percent fewer hours than the calculated RAP requirement, while FY13 was affected by 
the sequestration. One last significant finding was the existence of seasonality in the 
monthly data – certain months appeared, year over year, to yield significantly higher or 
lower SUTEs compared to other months.  Both of these findings were significant in 
building regression models. What could not be gleaned from a data review is what drives 
the general trend of declining fleet health metrics (AA rate and MC rate), and what causal 
relationship – if any – exists between the general trends of declining fleet health and 
declining SUTE.  
Another fascinating finding in this exploratory portion of the analysis was a 
declining utilization of AA hours across time. This ratio, which is defined as sorties per 
AA hours, is a different way of viewing utilization because it only accounts for the 
uptime of the fleet in the denominator instead of the TAI. What the graph in figure 7 
below shows is that over time, the F-16 community has decreased its conversion of AA 
hours, which can be viewed abstractly as sortie potential, into kinetic sorties by a factor 
of 15-20 percent. After hitting a notable low point in FY13, it appears that the utilization 
of AA has leveled off at a level around .024 from FY14 through FY19. And while it is 
good that the downward trend is seemingly curtailing, it is still alarming that the new 
baseline is so low compared to the first ten years in the data sample. 
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Figure 7. Declining Utilization of AA Hours over Time 
 
 The reason that this finding is so interesting is that it sits in stark contrast to what 
a person would expect if viewing the problem through a theoretical lens. In the face of an 
insatiable demand (in this case, the demand for sorties), one would assume that the 
resources to meet that demand (AA Hours) would be used at an increasing rate over time 
as they become increasingly scarce. The fact that this ratio has trended in the opposite 
direction is paradoxical and suggests that the Air Force has not been optimizing its 
existing AA. Future research should attempt to identify causal factors to this downward 
trend and suggest solutions for mitigating them. 
Model Creation 
As outlined in chapter III, the first step in model creation was to create three 
bivariate analyses, analyzing sorties to AA hours, annual SUTE to AA rate, and annual 
SUTE to MC rate. The results of these initial models are in the table below.  
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Table 4. Descriptions of Initial Annual Models 
 
  
This table reveals some early insights into the process. First, the new models 
show a much lower adjusted R-squared value than the model that describes the 
relationship from the research published by Ritschel et al. (2018). Secondly, it appears 
that the AA rate seems to correlate better to SUTE than the MC rate does. 
 After several tests with other possible dependent variables, the one other 
significant variable that helped describe the additional variance in annual SUTE was the 
aforementioned budget constraint years, represented in a linear regression model with 
binary indicator variables. The final model, created with annual data, is described in the 
table below. 
Table 5. Descriptions of Final Annual Models 
 
25 
 
This same process was then repeated with the monthly data, to similar findings, 
but with much lower R-squared values. This is most likely attributable to the outsize 
amount of noise encountered at such a granular level of data collection. One additional 
step that had to be taken with the monthly data was the addition of indicator variables for 
each month that would account for seasonality patterns. The final model created with 
monthly data is described in the table below.  
Table 6. Descriptions of Final Monthly Models 
 
26 
 
 When comparing the six final models in Tables 5 and 6, it becomes apparent that 
the relationship between availability and SUTE is better reflected over longer time 
domains; it appears that too much variability and noise exists in a granular monthly 
perspective to see the same levels of correlation. Also, the models in Figure 6 align with 
the ones in Figure 5 to suggest that AA rate is more applicable to explaining SUTE than 
MC rate is. For these reasons, the annual AA rate to the SUTE model was selected as the 
most appropriate model for moving forward with the research.  
Residual Analysis 
 A residual analysis was performed to ensure the validity of the model prior to 
using it to create any further conclusions. The plots created below were used to check for 
normality and constant variance.  While upon first glance the plots may have some 
possibility of being interpreted as non-normal or non-constantly varied (increasing 
residual magnitude as prediction magnitude increases); however, these tests are largely 
inconclusive, due in part to a low number of total residuals (20). The residual distribution 
histogram and a plot of residuals by predicted values are exhibited in the two figures 
below. 
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Figure 8. Residual Distribution Histogram 
 
Figure 9. Residual by Prediction Plot 
 Since neither of these tests proved decisive in failure, the model’s validity could 
not be rejected. Such a judgment call was not required for detecting autocorrelation, 
meanwhile, as the Durbin-Watson test yielded a p-value above the .05 threshold 
(p=.0654) threshold and as such independence can safely be assumed. With all three of 
the criteria of the residual analysis satisfied, the model can finally be employed. 
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Model Employment 
In equation form, the selected model for employment in solving for optimal AA 
rate is as follows: 
Y ൌ -224.47 ൅ 5.39X1 – 25.88X2     ሺ2ሻ 
Where: 
Y = Annual SUTE (sorties/TAI) 
 X1 = AA Rate 
X2 = Budget Constraint as Limiting Factor to Sortie Execution (binary) 
 
  
Before solving for AA rate, the required SUTE must first be defined. This is 
accomplished by calculating the aggregate sortie demand based on pilot training 
requirements and dividing by the TAI. The 440 pilots are split into subgroups of 154 
CMR-I, 209 CMR-E, and 77 BMC-E, which each have an annual demand of 108, 96, and 
60 sorties, respectively. In summation, this yields a RAP sortie requirement of 41,316 
sorties, which after the 10 percent overage allowance yields an annual sortie demand of 
45,448 sorties. This number translates to an average of 156.2 sorties per aircraft per year. 
With regards to the model equation, the target annual SUTE of 156.2 was 
substituted as the Y variable, and a value of 0 was input as X2  to represent a lack of 
budget constraints affecting flying rates. Then, through simple algebra, the X1 value was 
solved for which yielded a value of 70.6, meaning that an AA rate of 70.6 percent is the 
point prediction of fleet health requirement to achieve the 156.2 annual SUTE. 
Now, it is necessary to acknowledge that the model’s point prediction does not 
guarantee this output with the given inputs; rather, it is much more appropriate to discuss 
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in terms of confidence intervals. When the model yields a 156.2 SUTE point prediction 
from inputs of a 70.6 percent AA rate and no budget constraints, this really means is that 
the model has 50 percent confidence that these inputs yield an output of at least that point 
prediction value. Anecdotally, for most Air Force decision-makers, 50 percent confidence 
is insufficient to sign off on 70.6 percent as the right goal for AA. Alternatively, A better 
way to attack this problem is to solve for an input that predicts the desired percent 
possibility of yielding at least the desired SUTE. This exercise was completed using the 
JMP statistical software package, with the results as depicted in the table below. In short, 
historical data suggests that Air Force leaders can be reasonably confident (80-95 
percent) in achieving the desired SUTE rates with an AA rate of around 71 percent. 
Table 7. Expected Sortie Outputs at Various AA Rates 
 
                                                                                                      
Summary  
This chapter walked through the data analysis and the results interpretation 
process employed to answer the research questions at the heart of this thesis. By 
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executing the plan laid out in chapter III, this research established empirical evidence 
supporting some compelling conclusions. First among these is that AA rate and MC Rate 
levels can explain a major amount of variance in fleet utilization, but that other factors 
beyond fleet health also can constrain SUTE. The second inference is that AA rate is a 
better lever than the MC rate for influencing sortie utilization outputs. Finally, this 
research indicates that an AA rate near 71 percent yields an appropriately high level of 
confidence for achieving the SUTE rates needed to meet sortie demand.  
  
31 
 
V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions of Research 
The purpose of this research was answer the research questions described in 
chapter I. These research questions are reiterated below, along with their respective 
answers. 
Research Question 1: Can MC and/or AA rates be quantifiably correlated to 
increased aircraft utilization (SUTE)? 
Correlation exists between these metrics. Changes in the annual AA rate explain 
79 percent of the variance in annual SUTE, while changes in MC rate explain 65 percent 
of the variance. In the AA rate model, a 1 percent increase in fleet health correlates to an 
increase of 5.3 sorties/aircraft/year. While highly explanatory, both of these models have 
R-squared values below .80, suggesting that fleet health is not the only factor influencing 
sortie execution. 
Research Question 2: Is an 80 percent MC rate a valuable goal to achieve the 
necessary levels of flying? If not, what would a more functional goal be? 
AA rate appears to be the better of the two fleet health metrics to focus on in 
order to see effects in sortie execution rates. According to the model, a 71 percent AA 
rate yields the required annual SUTE at 84 percent confidence, which could be a more 
functional goal than MC80 to achieve the desired sortie outcomes. By happenstance, 
MC80 proved to be an effective goal to meet FY19 flying requirements due to the annual 
non-possession rate.  However, future MC rate goals should be based on a starting point 
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of a calculated AA rate goal, that then factors in projections for depot possessed and unit 
possessed-not reported aircraft, which can vary significantly year-over-year.   
Recommendations for Future Research 
Research needs to be directed towards explaining the other binding constraints 
that have contributed to the decrease in SUTE over time, which potentially further 
explains the variance in SUTE not attributable to change in fleet health. Also, future 
researchers should investigate the counterintuitive phenomenon whereby the utilization 
of AA hours (sorties/AA hour relationship) is decreasing, as explicated in chapter IV. 
Finally, this methodology should be applied to other F-16 operational communities, as 
well as other mission design series fleets, to determine the potential similarities or 
differences in the relationship between fleet health and utilization based on mission type, 
fleet age, etc. 
Summary 
Improving fleet health has long been a leading focus of Air Force research and 
improvement projects. Such efforts are incredibly valuable for development and fine-
tuning of tactics, techniques, procedures, perspectives, and best practices; however, these 
efforts come at the cost of time, effort, and dollars, and as such, must be measured. It is 
important that MC80 and other endeavors like it take historical performance data into 
account so that decision-makers can set realistic and practical goals. The MC80 goal was 
and continues to be, one of the more concerted and arguably successful endeavors that 
maintenance and sustainment units have undertaken.  Moreover, great strides in the AA 
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rate and MC rate seem to suggest that a great deal of organizational learning has occurred 
and that those lessons will yield future long-term benefits. Going forward, MC80 should 
continue to be the goal for combat coded units in the Air Force’s active duty component, 
as it will both continue to push Air Force units past its current performance level and will 
likely yield the fleet health needed to achieve sortie execution goals for flying units. 
Finally, an understanding that fleet health is not the only constraint that can limit sortie 
execution must be considered, and a more holistic approach to the topic must be adopted 
to further maximize sortie output with the available resources. 
34 
 
Bibliography 
ACC/A3T. F-16 Ready Aircrew Program (RAP) Tasking Memorandum. HQ Air Combat 
Command: Langley AFB VA, 1 Oct 2018. 
 
Chapa, Mark A. Predicting AA. MS Thesis, AFIT-ENS-GRP-13-J-2. School of Systems 
and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB 
OH, June 2013. 
 
Dahlman, Carl J.; Thaler, David E.; Assessing Unit Readiness: Case Study of an Air 
Force Fighter Wing. Research AND Development (RAND) Corporation, Santa 
Monica, CA. 2000. 
 
Department of the Air Force. Equipment Inventory, Status and Utilization Reporting.  
AFI 21-103, ACC Supplement. Washington: HQ USAF, 26 November 2018 
 
Department of the Air Force. F-16 -- Aircrew Training. AFMAN 11-2F-16, Vol 1. 
Washington: HQ USAF, 17 June 2019 
 
Department of the Air Force. Tactical Doctrine: Aircraft Maintenance. AFTTP 3-4.21, 
Vol 1. Washington: HQ USAF, 6 June 2017 
 
"Final Operational F-16s depart Hill AFB" (2017, September 22). 75 Air Base Wing 
Public Affairs. 22 September 2017. www.hill.af.mil/News/Article-
Display/Article/1321062/final-operational-f-16s-depart-hill-afb. Retrieved on 17 
Dec 2019. 
 
Fry, Frederick G. Optimizing AA: Where To Spend Your Next O&M Dollar. MS thesis, 
AFIT/GCA/ENV/10-M03.  School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute 
of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH,  March 2010. 
 
HAF/A4PR. "Linking Weapon System Sustainment to Readiness." Report to HAPF/A4.  
Washington: HQ USAF, 1 May 2019 
 
Bowerman, Bruce L.; O’Connell, Richard T..;  Koehler, Anne B. Forecasting, Time 
Series, and Regression – an Applied Approach. Brooks/Cole Cengage Learning, 
Belmont CA. 2005. 
 
Mattis, James N. NDS Implementation- Mission Capability of Critical Aviation 
Platforms. Memorandum. Washington: Department of Defense, 17 September 
2018.  
 
 
 
35 
 
Mehta, Aaron. "F-22, F-35 Jets Won't Hit Mattis' Readiness Targets." Defense News 
Conference. 4 September 2019. www.defensenews.com/smr/defense-news-
conference/2019/09/04/f-22-f-35-wont-hit-mattis-readiness-targets. Retrieved 5 
September 2019. 
 
Oliver, Stephen. A. Forecasting Readiness: Using Regression to Predict the Mission  
Capability of Air Force F-16 Fighter Aircraft. Forecasting Readiness: Using 
Regression to Predict the Mission Capability of Air Force F-16 Fighter Aircraft. 
MS Thesis. AFIT/GLM/ENS/01M- School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force 
Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH, March 2001. 
 
Rainey, James C.; McGonagle, Robert; Scott, Beth F.; Waller, Gail; Drew, John G. 
Maintenance Metrics: US Air Force.  Maxwell AFB OH: Air Force Logistics 
Management Agency. 20 December 2001. 
 
Ross, Derby. "Training Design and Ops Challenges." Presented at Sortie Production 
Training Summit, Langley AFB VA. 19 June 2018 
 
Ritschel, Jonathan D.; Ritschel, Tamiko L.; York, Nicole B. Providing a Piece of the  
Puzzle: Insights into the AA Conundrum Wright Patterson AFB 
OH: Journal of Defense Analytics and Logistics, 10 December 2018 Vol 3, No 1, 
29-40.    
 
"Search Authorizations" Assignment Management System (AMS). Datebase. Department 
of the Air Force. 
afas.afpc.randolph.af.mil/AMSNET40/OfficerAssign/SearchAuthorizations.aspx.  
Retrieved 16 January 2020. 
 
Walsh, Matthew; Taylor, William W.; Ausink, John A. Independent Review and 
Assessment of the Air Force Ready Aircrew Program. Research AND 
Development (RAND) Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 2019. 
 
“Weapon System Viewer” Logistics Information Management System – Enterprise View  
(LIMS-EV). Database. Department of the Air Force. https://lims-
ev.cce.af.mil/ledria/Main.html. Retrieved March 2019 – February 2020.  
  
36 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to 
Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis 
Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be 
subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
26-03-2020 
2. REPORT TYPE
Master’s Thesis  
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
Oct 2018 – Mar 2020
TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
MC80: Quantifying the Effect of Fleet Health on Sortie 
Execution in the F-16 Fleet 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6. AUTHOR(S)
Gladney, Kyle R., Captain, USAF 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/ENS)
2950 Hobson Way, Building 641
WPAFB OH 45433-8865
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER 
AFIT-ENS-MS-20-M-151
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE LOGISTICS PANEL
1690 AIR FORCE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON D.C. 20330-1670
robert.1.charlesworth.mil@mail.mil
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
ACRONYM(S)
HAF/A4P 
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
REPORT NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
DISTRUBTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States.
14. ABSTRACT
By order of the Secretary of Defense, all of the US Air Force's F-16 units were tasked to improve their
fleet health to a Mission Capability (MC) rate of 80 percent, as part of a Department of Defense-wide
push to make its Critical Aviation Platforms, and the units that employ them, more ready and lethal.
This study uses historical fleet health and sortie execution data captured from LIMS-EV to create a
multiple regression model that quantifies the value of increased fleet health, defined as either MC rate
or Aircraft Availability (AA) rate, in terms of increasing sortie output. It also uses forecasted near-
future sortie demand to assess the utility of the 80 percent MC rate standard in terms of achieving
desired sortie execution levels. This research concludes that both AA rate and MC rate correlate with
increased aircraft utilization, and that an increase in either fleet health metric correlates to an
increased annual utilization of roughly 5 sorties per aircraft. It also identifies AA rate as a more
significant input to sortie execution than MC rate is, and suggests that an AA rate standard of 71
percent is most appropriate for achieving the aircraft utilization levels needed to satisfy requirements.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
MC80, Maintenance, Utilization, AA, Regression
16. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF:
17. LIMITATION 
OF
   ABSTRACT 
UU
18. 
NUMBER  
OF PAGES 
46 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Dickens, John M., Lt Col, AFIT/ENS 
a. 
REPOR
T 
U 
b. 
ABSTRAC
T 
U 
c. THIS 
PAGE 
U 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
(937) 255-6565 x4319 
john.dickens@afit.edu 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18
